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Social vs. risk preferences 
under the veil of ignorance
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This paper reports experimental evidence from a Dictator Game 
experiment in which subjects choose repeatedly one out of four options 
involving a pair of fixed monetary prizes, one for them, one for another 
anonymously matched subject. In some sessions, player position (i.e. the 
identity of the best paid agent, constant across all options) is known in 
advance before subjects have to make their decision; in other sessions 
subjects choose “under the veil of ignorance”, not knowing to which 
player position they will be eventually assigned. We also collect evidence 
from additional sessions in which the same options correspond to binary 
lotteries, in which subjects may win the high or the low prize, but their 
decisions do not affect other participants. We frame subjects’ decisions 
within the realm of a simple mean-variance utility maximization problem, 
where the parameter associated to the variance is interpreted, depending 
on the treatment conditions, as a measure of pure risk aversion, pure 
inequality aversion, or some combination of the two. We also condition 
our estimates to subjects’ individual socio-demographic characteristics. 
 
Keywords: dictator games, social preferences, risk preferences, functional 
identification. 
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At ﬁrst sight, risk and inequality aversion appear to be unrelated concepts.
With the former, we refer to “the reluctance of a person to accept a bargain
with an uncertain payoﬀ rather than another bargain with a more certain,
but possibly lower, expected payoﬀ”; with the latter, “the preference for
fairness and resistance to inequitable outcomes.”1
However, when taking a closer look, these two concepts can be related
on several grounds. The ﬁrst, intuitive connection comes from the fact that
they both rely on some measure of distance (or distribution) of outcomes.
In this respect, a risk-averse individual is willing to accept a lower expected
reward in search of a smaller outcome variability and -by the same token-
an inequity averse individual is willing to opt for a poorer society, if this im-
plies less income inequality. The hypothetical frame of the veil of ignorance
(VOI hereafter) is built exactly upon this intuitive similarity. Rousseau’s
[25] original position is, probably the ﬁrst example of the VOI: the idea is
to look at constitutional rules from the point of view of an outside observer,
not knowing which will eventually be her player position (call it income,
social status, opportunities) in the society. A similar viewpoint is taken
by John Rawls’ [24] inﬂuential book, The Theory of Justice,i nw h i c ht h e
VOI is applied to put forward the maxmin principle as the rational prin-
ciple to implement social justice. As it is well known, this view has been
strongly criticized by John Harsanyi’s [17] treatment of the VOI, by which
the utilitaristic approach is justiﬁed by the fact that the preferences of an
“impartial and sympathetic” observer should be concerned with “. . . the
welfare of each participant but having no partial bias in favor of any partic-
ipant... (p. 49)”. At the core of Harsanyi’s argument lies the idea that it is
possible to make distributional judgements taking expectations over purely
self-interested preferences, once the probability (and the associated risk) of
being any “participant” in the society is properly taken into account. In
this respect, it is exactly the VOI hypothetical frame which provides purely
self-interested preferences with a distributional taste.
Thirty years later, many economists are now used to think that distri-
butional (or “social”) preferences may well exist even without the ﬁctitious
frame of the VOI. This view has been largely inﬂuenced by the vast ex-
perimental literature showing that subjects, in many classic experimental
protocols, exhibit social preferences, with a strong taste against inequality.2
1Both deﬁnitions are borrowed from the correponding entries of Wikipedia
(http://www.wikipedia.org).
2This literature is well summarized in the surveys of Fehr and Schmidt [13] and Sobel
2This, implicitly, challenges Harsanyi’s claim, unless it is provided a suit-
able frame in which we can disentangle risk from distributional concerns,
when it comes to situations in which individuals have to choose among risky
prospects which aﬀect the well-being of others.
Whether individuals exhibit social preference when choosing under the
VOI remains, essentially, an empirical matter. In this respect, there is a
growing empirical literature which use questionnaire data to estimate risk
and distributional preferences of the same subject pool. Paradigmatic is the
case of Carlsson et al. [9], who measure subjects’ preferences for risk and
inequality through choices between imagined societies and lotteries. They
also collect personal information on the socio-demographic characteristics
of their subject pool, concluding that “ ... (even under the veil of igno-
rance) many people appear to have preferences regarding equality per se. We
have also found that both relative risk aversion and inequality aversion vary
with sex and political preferences. On average, women and left-wing voters
have higher parameter values for both relative risk aversion and inequality
aversion” (p. 391).3
In this literature, subjects mainly face hypothetical situations and, in
this sense, their viewpoint resembles that of Harsanyi’s “impartial and sym-
pathetic observer”. In this paper, we shall measure subjects’ risk and dis-
tributional concerns relying on experimental methods. In particular, we
estimate risk and inequality aversion using observations from subjects’ ac-
tual decisions (that is, decisions which directly aﬀect their own, together with
others’, ﬁnancial rewards in the experiment).4 To this aim, we borrow the
design (and part of the experimental evidence) from the work of Cabrales
et al. [7] (CABRA hereafter), who set up a complex 3-phase experimental
design to estimate subjects’ social preferences (within the realm of Fehr and
Schmidt’s [12] model, F&S hereafter) to explain (and predict) their behavior
in a stylized (matching) labor market. Distributional preference parameters
are estimated in the ﬁrst phase of the experiment, a simple Dictator Game
in which subjects repeatedly select their favorite option among a ﬁxed menu
of four, which changes at every round. Each option consists in two monetary
prizes, one for them, one for another (randomly and anonymously matched)
subject participating to the experiment.
In CABRA player position (i.e. the identity of the best paid agent) is
constant across options, and known in advance before subjects have to make
[26].
3See also Amiel et al. [1] and Bosmans and Schokkaert [6]
4In this respect, our experimental setting is closer to those of Kroll and Davidovitz [22]
and H˝ orish [19].
3their decisions. In this paper, we complement their evidence (T1) with two
additional treatments in which
1. subjects face the same sequence of decisions under the VOI, knowing
ex-ante that either player position is equally likely (T2), or
2. the same sequence of decisions is made under a “lottery frame”, in
which player position is unknown (and equally likely), but there is no
payoﬀ externality on others (T3).
W h i l eC A B R Ae m p l o yF & St oe s t i m a t es ubjects’ purely distributional
preferences, in this paper we posit a simple mean-variance utility model,
where, depending on the treatments, the parameter associated with the
variance measures pure inequality aversion (T1), pure risk aversion (T3)o r ,
in the VOI treatment T2, some combination of the two. In this respect,
t h ee x e r c i s eh e r ei sr a t h e rd i ﬀerent from that of the literature cited above:
we exploit the experimental methodology by designing speciﬁc economic en-
vironments in which, sometimes risk and inequality concerns are isolated,
sometime they are combined, checking how these alternative decision frames
aﬀect the estimates of the same parameter, under the same statistical model.
Finally, we also conditions our estimates to some socio-demographic charac-
teristics we infer from a detailed questionnaire, administered to all subjects
at the end of each section.
In summarizing our ﬁnding, we shall treat T2 as our “control condition”,
where both risk and inequality concerns should supposedly guide subjects’
decisions, checking whether in T1 and T3 -when only one dimension is present
at a time- the estimated parameters move signiﬁcantly. In this respect, we
ﬁnd that both pooled and individual estimated parameter distributions in T2
and T3 are remarkably similar. By stark contrast, the estimated inequality
aversion in T1 is signiﬁcantly lower. This would imply that we can simply
relying on risk aversion to explain subjects’ behavior under the VOI. Our
individual regressions also show a signiﬁcant variability in the estimated
parameters, across subjects and treatments. When we use our questionnaire
to give an account of this heterogeneity, we ﬁnd that Social Capital variables
have a greater impact on the estimated parameters than more traditional
socio-demographics, such as disposable income or family wealth.
The remainder of this paper is arranged as follows. In Section 2 we
brieﬂy describe our experimental design, where in Section 3 we present the
results of our econometric exercise. Finally, Section 4 concludes, followed
by an Appendix containing the experimental instructions.
42 Experimental design
In what follows, we describe the features of our experimental environment.
2.1 Sessions
We run 8 sessions under 3 diﬀerent treatments: 3 sessions for each of the
“Dictator Game” treatments, T1 and T2, 2 sessions for the “Lottery” treat-
ment, T3. All experimental sessions were conducted at the Laboratory of
Theoretical and Experimental Economics (LaTEx), of the Universidad de
Alicante. A total of 192 students (24 per session) were recruited among the
undergraduate population of the Universidad de Alicante. The experimen-
tal sessions were computerized.5 Instructions were read aloud and we let
subjects ask about any doubt they may have had. In all sessions (but those
of the lottery treatment T3), subjects were divided into two matching groups
of 12, with subjects from diﬀerent matching groups never interacting with
each other throughout the session.6
All treatments share the same basic layout. At the beginning of each
round t =1 ,...,24, subjects are informed about the choice set Ct =
©
bk : k =1 ,...,4
ª
,






assigns a ﬁxed mon-
etary prize bk
i to player i =1 ,2, with bk
1 ≥ bk
2, for all k. After subjects have
selected their favorite options, all payoﬀ relevant information is revealed and
payoﬀs are distributed.
2.2 Treatments
We now explain the details of our 3 experimental conditions.
2.2.1 T1 : pure inequality (CABRA)
In T1, subjects choose their preferred option after being informed about the
outcome of the iid draw which ﬁxes the player (i.e. their relative) position
for that pair and round. Remember that, since bk
1 ≥ bk
2, player 1 (2) looks at
the distributional problem implicit in the option choice from the viewpoint of
5The experiment was programmed and conducted w i t ht h es o f t w a r ez - T r e e( F i s c h b a c h e r
[14]). The complete set of instructions, translated into English, can be found in the
Appendix.
6Given this design feature, we shall read the data under the assumption that the
history of each matching group corresponds to an independent observation. Clearly, the
same does not apply in case of T3, in that each subject’s experimental history corresponds
to an independent observation.
5the (dis)advantaged player. Once choices are made, we employ a “Random
Dictator” protocol (Harrison and McDaniel [16]) to determine the payoﬀ
relevant decision, in that another iid draw ﬁxes the identity of the subject
whose choice determines the monetary rewards for that pair and round.7
2.2.2 T2 : VOI
In treatment T2 we modify the control treatment T1 by introducing the
VOI. In this case, subjects only know that the ex-ante probability of being
assigned to either player position equals 1
2. Everything else is just as in T1,
in particular the fact that subjects alternate player and Dictator positions
in a (iid) random fashion.
2.2.3 T3 : pure risk (lottery)
Our lottery treatment T3 replicates treatment T2 without any payoﬀ ex-
t e r n a l i t yo no t h e r s . In this case, player position is uncertain (and equally
likely), but each subject decides in isolation.
2.3 Financial rewards
All monetary payoﬀs in the experiment were expressed in Spanish Pesetas
(1 euro is approx. 166 ptas.).8 Subjects received 1.000 ptas. just to show
up, to which they summed up all their cumulative earnings throughout the
24 rounds of the experiment. Average earnings were about 12 euros, for an
experimental session lasting for approximately 45 minutes.
2.4 The Questionnaire
At the end of each session, subjects were asked to answer a detailed ques-
tionnaire from which we distilled the following variables, which are used in
7CABRA also consider a treatment in which i) only the Dictator chooses and ii) sub-
jects are assigned to the same player positon at all time. They show that parameter
distributions are basically identical to those of T1, where the same conclusions also holds
under our statistical frame (reslts are not reported here, but are available upon request).
8It is standard practice, for all experiments run in Alicante, to use Spanish ptas. as
experimental currency. The reason for this design choice is twofold. First, it mitigates
integer problems, compared with other currencies (USD or Euros, for example). On
the other hand, although Spanish pesetas are no longer in use (substituted by the Euro
in the year 2002), Spanish people still use Pesetas to express monetary values in their
everyday life. In this respect, by using a “real” (as a opposed to an artiﬁcial) currency,
we avoid the problem of framing the incentive structure of the experiment using a scale
(e.g. “Experimental Currency”) with no cognitive content.
6Section 3.3.
1. Gender=1 for females;
2. RiskLover∈ [0,1], indicating the relative frequency of “risky” choices
in a series of 5 binary lotteries Holt and Laury’s [18] style.
3. WeeklyBudget∈ [0,400]. In Euro, a proxy of subjects’ disposable in-
come.
4. RoomSizeRatio: the ratio between number of rooms of the main res-
idence and the number of the family members (i.e., a proxy of the
family’s wealth).
5. Satisfaction. “How do you feel in this moment with your life?”.7 -
scaled answer from 0 (“Not at all satisﬁed”)t o1( “Very satisﬁed”).
6. Felicity. “Taking everything into consideration, would you call yourself
i) very happy (Fel=1); ii) quite happy (Fel=.5); iii) not very happy
(Fel=0).
7. Inequality∈ {0,1}. A classic test of concerns for inequality, contained
in many Social Capital questionnaires. Q. “Consider the following
situation: Two secretaries with the same age do exactly the same work.
However, one of them earns 20 euros per week more than the other.
The one that is paid more is more eﬃcient and faster, while working.
Do you believe it is fair that one earns more than the other?”. IA=1
if the answer is no, and 0 otherwise.
8. Parents∈ {0,1}. Another classic question. Choose between “Indepen-
dently of the qualities and deﬁciencies of parents, they should always be
loved and respected”( PAR=0) and “Parents who have not earned the
love by their attitudes and behavior should not be loved”( PAR=1).
3 Estimating social and risk preferences
In what follows, i (and j) identify our subjects in T3 (matched in pair










the arithmetic mean and standard deviation of the monetary payoﬀs asso-
ciated with option k, respectively. We assume that subject i’s preferences
by choosing option k =1 ,...4, are deﬁned by the following




i in treatment T1,v i(k)=µ(k) in treatments T2 and T3,
and εk
i is an idiosyncratic error term (with zero mean and ﬁxed variance) to
facilitate estimation. Deﬁnition 1 postulates that subjects evaluate options
by way of a simple mean-variance utility function (with noise), where the
interpretation of γi depends on the treatment.
1. In treatment T1,γ i measures a pure distributional concern. Since
subjects are informed about their player position before they have to
decide their favorite option, using F&S’ terminology, we can think of
γi as a direct measure “inequality aversion”.
2. In T3 subjects face ordinary binary lotteries. Therefore, in this case, γi
measures pure risk aversion (with γi =0indicating the null hypothesis
of risk-neutrality).
3. Also in T2 i chooses among lotteries, but this decision has distribu-
tional consequences for player j, too. In this sense, we expect γi to
capture some combination of both eﬀects, one related to risk, the other
to inequality.
According to this notation, subject i chooses contract ˆ k at round t if
ˆ k =a r gm a x
k
{ui(k)}.
Under the assumption that the stochastic term εk
i i si i dw i t ha ne x t r e m e
value distribution, the probability that individual i chooses the contract k
at round t is therefore
Pr
³










Notice that (2) allows for parameter heterogeneity across subjects. Thus,
the iid assumption does not stem from neglected individual unobserved het-
erogeneity, and it is consistent with the random order of the four contracts
in the choice set Ct.
83.1 Pool estimates
Table 1 report estimates of γi “pooled” by treatment, i.e. when (1) is
estimated under the assumption that γi is constant across treatment Th
(i.e. γi = gh,h=1 ,...,3).S i n c e ,i nT1, subjects choose their favorite option
knowing their player position, we also provide pool estimates conditional on
player position i =1 ,2, g1
i . The reported estimated standard errors in Table
1 take into account matching group clustering.
Coeff. Std. err. p − value 95% conf. int.
g1 .267 .304 0 .208 .327
g1
1 .871 .394 .027 .098 1.644
g1
2 .208 .039 0 .132 .285
g2 .347 .0131 0.020 .321 .372
g3 .316 .016 0 .286 .347
Table 1: Pool estimates of γi
As Table 1 shows, all estimated parameters are signiﬁcantly greater than
zero, indicating inequality/risk aversion of our “representative subjects” in
the three treatments. As for the comparison across treatments, we shall
treat T2 as our “control condition”, where both risk and inequality concerns
are supposed to guide subjects’ decision, checking in T1 and T3, (if and) how
the estimated parameter changes when only one dimension is present at a
time. In this respect, Table 1 shows that T2 is characterized by the highest
value for γ,a n dT1 by the highest dispersion. The only signiﬁcant diﬀerence
is that between between g1 and g2 (z = −2.4,p= .017), indicating that, in
absence of any uncertainty about player position assignment, the estimated
inequality aversion lowers signiﬁcantly. By contrast, we cannot reject the
null of equality between g2 and g3, suggesting that we could simply relying on
risk aversion to explain subjects’ behavior in T2.O n c e,i nT1, we condition
the estimate of γ on player position, we ﬁnd, consistently with Cabrales et
al. [7], that “guilt” (i.e. sensitiveness to payoﬀ diﬀerence when enjoying
an advantageous relative position) is higher than “envy” (i.e. sensitiveness
to player position when suﬀering the lower end of the stick), although the
diﬀerence in not signiﬁcant (z = −1.61,p= .106).
3.2 Individual Estimates
Figure 1 reports the distributions of individual γi, disaggregated for treat-
ment conditions, T1 to T3, using 24 observations for each individual estima-
9tion.
Figure 1 conﬁrms our preliminary conclusions from Table 1, where T2
and T3 distributions are remarkably similar (both are positively skewed, with
very few subjects characterized by a negative estimated parameter). By
contrast, the parameter distribution in T3 display higher dispersion, and we
also ﬁnd a higher frequency of inequality “lovers” (i.e. subjects with γi < 0)
than those of T2 and T3. This should explain why the pooled estimate in T1
is signiﬁcantly lower.
Figure 1. Individual estimates of γi
Clearly, Figure 1 cannot take into account the standard errors of the
individual estimates. This is why, in Table 2, we summarize our results on
subjects’ preference heterogeneity by partitioning our subject pool, assigning
each subject to a category (from “lover” to “averse”) depending on whether
or not her estimated γi complies (at the 10% conﬁdence level) with the null
hypothesis of neutrality to risk/inequality.





































Table 2: Partitioning our subject pool with respect to their attitude toward
inequality/risk
10Once again, Table 2 conﬁrms previous analysis: we ﬁnd an homogeneous
partition in T2 and T3, while the relative frequency of inequality averse
subjects in T1 is about 10% lower.
3.3 Socio-demographics and Social Capital
As we already discussed in Section 2.4, we collected information on individ-
ual socio-demographics, risk and social attitudes. In Table 3, we condition
the estimates of γi upon this personal information. Again, also in Table 3
standard errors are adjusted to take into account matching group clustering.














































Table 3: Estimates of γi conditional on socio-demographics. Standard errors
between brackets. ***=1 % signiﬁcant; **=5 % signiﬁcant; *=10 % signiﬁcant.
In what follows, we shall comment on the role of each explanatory vari-
able in the three regressions.
1. gender is (negative and) signiﬁcant in T2 only. Our negative coeﬃ-
cient contradicts the reported evidence in Carlsson et al. [9], in that
women, under the VOI, exhibit lower risk/inequality aversion than
men.9 As for the relation between gender and risk aversion, despite
the (negative and) signiﬁcant correlation between gender and RL
(coeﬀ. -0.285, p =0 ) , women in T3 do not show higher risk aversion.
2. RL is negative and signiﬁcant for all treatments, except for T1,t h e
one in which subjects face no risk whatsoever. While the coeﬃcient
for T3 is easy to rationalize (less risk averse subjects according to the
questionnaire, also reveal lower risk aversion thought their experimen-
tal decisions), the (negative and) signiﬁcant impact of RL in T2 is
consistent with our previous results, in that the estimate of γ in T2
appears to depend more on risk, rather than inequality, aversion.
9Croson and Gneezy’s [11] survey on gender diﬀerences in preferences warns that
women’s altruistic motives are not uniformly stronger than those of men, but simply
more situationally speciﬁc.
113. Social Capital proxies. While other “classic” socio-demographics
variables -such as subjects’ disposable income, or wealth, proxied by
WB and RSR- are never signiﬁcant (and we omit to report the cor-
responding estimates in Table 3), other Social Capital proxies, mostly
related to subjects’ self assessed overall well-being state, aﬀect our es-
timation in unexpected directions. For example, high Sat pushes up
inequality aversion in T1, while high Fel pushes down risk aversion in
T3. On the other hand, Par and Ineq are (positive and) signiﬁcant
only in case of T3 and T2, respectively.
4. Constant. Positive and (highly) signiﬁcant in case of T2 and T3 only,
showing the absence of a signiﬁcant “treatment eﬀect” in the measure-
ment of γ in T1, once we controlled for the other variables reported in
Table 3.
4C o n c l u s i o n
Our experimental evidence suggests that, under the VOI, subjects’ aversion
to outcome variability mostly reﬂects risk, rather than distributional, con-
cerns, although both components, when operating alone, are signiﬁcant mo-
tivators to action. We also see that subjects’ heterogeneity is well captured
by some Social Capital proxies, which more and more often complement
standard socio-demographic variables, and that the same personal charac-
teristics operate in rather diﬀerent ways, depending on whether only risk
or inequality characterizes the choice environment, or both.10 In addition,
typical proxies for risk attitude (such as our RL variable) have a signiﬁ-
cant impact in subjects’ distributional choices, so as typical Social Capital
proxies have a signiﬁcant impact on purely risky decisions. All this evidence
seems to suggest that risk and distributional concerns are not independent
behavioral phenomena, and that their intrinsic relation is more complex
than what is usually assumed.11
In a recent paper, Andersen et al. [2] ﬁnd that joint elicitation of risk and
time preferences provides estimates of discount rates that are signiﬁcantly
lower than those put forward by previous literature. While they reach this
conclusion by disentangling risk and time preferences by functional iden-
tiﬁcation, what we ﬁnd here is somewhat similar, in that we show that
10In this respect, our ﬁndings are in line with those of Capra et al. [8].
11Along a similar vein, Kovarik [21] shows how altruistic motives decay when monetary
consequences move further away in the future.
12distributional concerns may well vary, depending on the degree of uncer-
tainty that characterizes the choice environment. It may be worthwhile to
remember that most of the discussion on distributional preferences has been
built on evidence of experimental protocols (such as the Dictator Game) in
which subjects face no uncertainty whatsoever. By introducing uncertainty
in the simplest possible way (via totally exogenous random devices), what
we observe is a signiﬁcant variation in our estimations.
These considerations may have important behavioral consequences, well
beyond the -somehow artiﬁcial- frame of the VOI. Consider, like in Karni et
al. [20], situations in which subjects unilaterally decide on the distribution
of the probabilities with which an indivisible prize is to be allocated to them,
rather than to (an)other subject(s).12 Or, like in Bolton et al. [5], situations
in which random devices are used to implement distributional justice. Last,
but not least, in more complex environments -such as Ultimatum Games-
in which distributional concerns interact with strategic uncertainty.13
We conclude by indicating an interesting avenue for future research,
which is related to the distribution of risk across subjects (i.e., what is
usually deﬁned as aggregate risk). In our VOI treatment, risk is (perfectly
and) negatively correlated across subjects, in the sense that being assigned
to one player position directly implies the assignment of the other player
position to the other couplemate. This is a situation in which aggregate risk
is completely absent, in that any given option always distributes -within the
pair- the same ﬁnancial reward. Consider, instead, the case in which player
assignments were completely independent, or (perfectly and) positively cor-
related.14 In the latter case, any model of distributional preferences a’ la
F&S would predict no diﬀerence in behavior, when compared with ordinary
lotteries, like our T3. On the other hand, subjects may indeed show social
preferences by controlling, through their decision, the aggregate risk sharing
distribution within the group.
12Unlike Andreoni and Miller (2000) or Fisman et al. [15], whose protocols involves
subjects allocating tokens between themselves and other subject(s) in a deterministic
fashion, in Karni et al. [20] subjects allocate probabilities (i.e., once again, risk and
distributional concerns are diﬃcult to identify).
13Take, for example, Prasnikar and Roth [23] or Binmore et al. [4].
14These two latter environments are exactly those explored in Kroll and Davidovitz [22],
in a very original experimental protocol, using as subjects pool primary shool kids.
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